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Abstract—In a cognitive radio network (CRN), the primary
users (PUs) do not operate their spectra, full time. Thus, they can
sell them to the secondary users (SUs), for a second use, during
the free time slots. In this article, we assume that the market is
perfect, monopolized by a single PU, and all players are rational.
After formulating the PU’s profit, we established a necessary
and sufficient condition that guarantees the introduction of the
PU into the market. In addition, the expressions of the SUs’
profits, showed us that in non-cooperative form, some ones got
zero profit, even after maximizing their profits. Therefore, we
have considered to study the effect of cooperation on the profits
of this category of SUs. By following this step, we established
a cooperation strategy, to avoid zero profits for all SUs. In
order to analyze the impact of this cooperation on the PU, we
have expressed the profits of the PU in the cooperative and
non-cooperative forms; as result, we found that the cooperation
between SUs brought better than the non-cooperative form.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, economic game, co-
operation, non-cooperation, monopoly market, primary user,
secondary users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase in wireless services over the last two decades
has intensifies the demand for spectra. This situation forced
the modification of the fixed frequency allocation policy. In
2003, the Federal Communications Commission has decided
to follow a new strategy, able of managing spectra more
effectively [1]. The provided efforts in this direction, have
led to the emergence of the famous cognitive radio network
(CRN). This new technology found a rigid platform in the
software defined radio, already designed.
Unlike the conventional networks, where the spectrum al-
location is static in terms of time, space and user; the CRN
offered a dynamic aspect, following all these dimensions [2].
As result, the environment dynamically changes and the users
are forced to configure their settings, in order to adapt to
the new changes. This type of network serves two types of
customers: PUs or licensed users, who have the priority to
use the spectrum, without privatization; and SUs or unlicensed
users, who are waiting for the release of certain spectra, for an
opportunistic use. Therefore, from time to time, some spectra
are available for a second use. consequently, the spectrum
sharing policy between the SUs and the comfort of the PUs
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represent the major challenges of CRN. Consequently, several
constraints must be taken into account, when designing a CRN;
among them we cite: the collision between the PUs and the
SUs, energy consumption [4], interference, SUs’ throughput
and fairness [3], routing [5] as well as security [6]. The aims
of CRN consist of overcoming these challenges, by using the
available and appropriate theoretical and physical foundations.
In this study, we are only interested in the theoretical bases,
particularly to the application of game theory, for sharing the
spectra between the unlicensed users.
The game theory is a branch of applied mathematics,
developed to study the conflict and cooperation, between the
rational entities, namely, players. It provides a language for
formulating and analyzing the strategic scenarios. The first
concepts of game theory are introduced by von Neumann and
Morgenstern [7]. After, the conceptual field has been extended
by the successors.
A game can be represented in the extensive or strategic
form. The first is illustrated by a tree, where the nodes
represent the players or the outcomes, and the branches expose
the strategies or portions of probability. This type of game
takes place when the players act sequentially. On the other
side, the strategic form is used when the players act in parallel.
It is defined by a set of players, the strategies of each player
and the payoff function corresponding to both: a combination
of pure strategies and a given player. When each player
is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other
players, and no player has anything to gain, by changing only
his own strategy, we talk about the famous pure strategy Nash
equilibrium [8]. In the absence of this solution, we can think
of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, by randomising over
several actions of a player and looking for the solution points
[9]. The games can be classified according to four families
[10]: cooperative, non-cooperative, stochastic and economic
games.
This work focuses on the application of an economic game
on CRN, where the seller is the PU, the buyers are the SUs
and the good for sale is the spectrum. This market is supposed
to be perfect, because the information is accessible by all the
actors. The players are considered rational, since they seek
to maximize their profits. The profit of each SU is expressed
by a utility function that depends on the unit price and the
quantity purchased. In addition to the unit price, the PU’s
utility function depends on the total quantity purchased. After
the maximisation of these functions, we find the quantity to
buy by each SU, and the unit price specified by the PU.
These results tell us that in some cases, the PU can reap zero
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profit, hence the need to establish a condition guaranteeing
the participation of the PU. Likewise, some SUs can reap
zero profit, when they act selfishly; but, when they cooperate,
each of them will have a non-zero profit. In addition, this
cooperation has a positive effect on the profit of the PU too.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II,
we expose some related works treating the economic game
in CRN. Section III analyses the PU’s and SUs’ profits.
The transactions are studies in section IV. We present the
simulation results in section V. We conclude in section VI.
Finally, section VII is reserved to the dicussion.
II. RELATED WORKS
A comparison can be made between the concepts of game
theory and those of CRN, as presented in table 1.
TABLE I
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GAME THEORY AND CRN
[10]
Game theory CRN
Players Only SUs, or both SUs and PUs
Strategies SUs: sensing, configuration and transmission.
PUs: selection of licenced bands and SUs.
Payoff/utility function SUs: Increasing the QoS.
PUs: monitory gain.
Cooperation or not SUs may cooperate to share spectra,
as they may selfishly behave.
Two wireless spectrum service providers (SSPs) competed in
[11, 12], for attracting the end users to puchase the spec-
trum, in order to maximize their own profits. This situation
is designed and analysed by a game model, to determine
the spectrum pricing strategies and the equilibrium points.
The authors of [11] treated the static game with complete
information, which leaded to both market stability and pure
Nash equilibrium. After, they studied a dynamic game with
limited information, which provided a dynamic adjustment
method and ensured the convergence to the Nash equilibrium
of the sub-games. Based on the Markov chain model and
queuing theory [12]; the authors demonstrated the presence
and uniqueness of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the
game between a SSP and its end users.
Certainly, the SUs contribute to the CRN performances, by
sensing and sharing the free spectra. They can act cooper-
atively or selfishly. In the literature, there are many works
treating these two modes, sometimes jointly and sometimes
separately [13]-[16]. For the purpose of studying coverage
and spectrum efficiency, as well as preventing two-level in-
terference [13]; the authors formulated the competition case
by static Cournot game with global information, and the
cooperation case by Stackelberg game based on dynamic price
adjustment algorithms. They proposed a new utility-driven
relay scheme and introduced both: a new protocol and a
refund factor. Their approach leaded at the convergence of
algorithms, therefore at the existence of equilibrium. The PUs
can cooperate and share the useful information, namely, the
channel weights with the SUs that selfishly act in a distributed
resource allocation case [14]. Based on the PUs’ cooperation,
the authors reduced the interference between the licensed users
and unlicensed users below a threshold, whereas the selfish
behavior of all SUs, leaded to a Nash Equilibrium.
Intuitively speaking, neither cooperation nor competition is
extremely positive or negative: each one has its advantages
and its limitations. The collaboration between SUs widened
the covered region, increased the number of detected channels
and ensured fairness among the unlicensed users [15]; as
well as, it improved the bandwidth utilization efficiency and
increased the throughput of the entire network, compared
with respect to basic one-tier CRN and non-optimized two-
tier CRN. In [16], the authors used a game theoretical tool
in the Internet of Things topic, as a result, they proved
that the interactive feedback approach improved the spectrum
utilization, and can be adapted to a non-cooperative repeated
process. Certainly, the cooperation takes part of occupation
of each user that contributes in the resolution of the collective
problems. This choice could degrade the performance of some
users, compared to a selfish reaction [17], where the authors
applied the matching-theory-based works, by mapping the
elements from two sets of equal size, based on the individual
preference of the candidates. Therefore, they proved that this
scheme, can be extended to match the SUs, with the channels
or the PUs.
The presence of PUs, channels and SUs in the same environ-
ment, puts all in a situation similar to a market [18]. In order
to guarantee a cost-effective bandwidth provisioning in Multi-
layer CRNs; the authors adapted news vendor model, from
logistics which is compared with an adaptive period inventory
management policy. After this analysis, they concluded that: it
provided decision makers, with more stable supply solutions,
and improved both: the total profit and user satisfaction levels.
In summary, game theory is introduced in CRN [10]-[18].
The users can cooperate as they can act selfishly. But neither
cooperation nor competition is extremely positive or negative:
each has its advantages and its limits [11]-[17].
Auction mechanism approach helps the SUs to get a part of
the unused license band, for a lease, from the PUs [19, 20].
The authors of [19] proposed a new framwork, based on the
negligible mutual interferences and satisfaction levels among
the SUs, to share the leased band. Their simulation results
showed that the proposed mechanism enhanced the spectral
efficiency of the SUs and increased the PUs’ revenues.
The vehicular networks is an environment with multi radio
access, different user preferences, multiple application re-
quirements and multiple device types. Hence, it becomes a
challenge for CR vehicular node to select the optimal network.
Highlighting, the competition between different CR vehicular
node and access networks can be formulated as multi-bidder
bidding to provide its services to CR vehicular node. The paper
[20] proposed a new cost function based multiple attribute
decision making method which outperforms other existing
methods. The numerical results reveled that the proposed
scheme is effective for spectrum handoff for optimal network
selection among multiple available networks.
In order to make a comparison between cooperation and
non-cooperation between users, the authors of [21], studied
the cooperative spectrum sharing among a PU and multiple
secondary users (SUs), where the PU selects a proper set
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of secondary users to serve as the cooperative relays for its
transmission. They assumed that the PU and SUs are rational
and selfish. As return, the PU leases portion of channel access
time to the selected SUs for their transmissions, and the
cooperative relays decide their respective power level used
to help PU’s transmission in order to achieve proportional
access time to the channel. Since the SU’s utility is a function
of its own transmission rate and the power cost for PU’s
transmission, the SUs will choose a proper power level to meet
the tradeoff between transmission rate and power cost. After
the formulation of problem as a non-cooperative game between
the PU and the SUs, the authors proved that the proposed game
converges to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
In all these works, the PU introduced into the market,
whatever the conditions, even if he will get zero profit; also,
the positive impact of the cooperation between the SUs, on
the PU’ profit is not mentioned. Our main contributions in
this work are:
1) The establishment of the necessary and sufficient con-
dition leading to the introduction of the PU into a
monopoly market.
2) The demonstration of the importance of cooperation,
among the SUs who have zero profit in the non co-
operative case.
3) The proof of the positive impact of cooperation between
SUs on the PU’s profit too.
III. PU’S AND SU’S PROFIT
In a market, with complete information and rational players;
each actor calculates his profit, before participating in a
transaction. If the obtained value is greater than a threshold,
the player enters into the market; otherwise, he decides not to
enter. In the follows, we will calculate the profits of each SU
and the PU; to determine the conditions of their participation
A. SU’s Profit
Let 𝑈𝑖 be the profit or utility function of 𝑆𝑈𝑖 . It is given in
[22] by:
𝑈𝑖 (𝑞𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑞2𝑖 − 𝑝𝑞𝑖 . (1)
Such as: 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑝 are: two real positives, purchased
quantity and unit price, respectively.
𝑈𝑖 (𝑞𝑖) has a monetary unit (MU), and that of 𝑞𝑖 is second
(s). Based on that, we can deduce the units of all defined
parameters, in the next formulation part.
We assume that each 𝑆𝑈𝑖 is rational: he chooses the optimal
quantity 𝑞∗
𝑖
that leads at the maximum profit. Since 𝑈𝑖 is
differentiable, 𝑞∗
𝑖
satisfies the optimality first condition:
𝑈
′
𝑖 (𝑞∗𝑖 ) = 𝛼𝑖 − 2𝛽𝑖𝑞∗𝑖 − 𝑝 = 0. (2)
2𝛽𝑖𝑞∗𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑝,∀𝑖 ∈ {𝑖, .., 𝑛}. (3)




When we put: 1
𝛽𝑖
= 𝜎𝑖 , we obtain:
𝑈𝑖 (𝑞∗𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝑖𝑞∗2𝑖 =
1
4
𝜎𝑖 (𝛼𝑖 − 𝑝)2. (5)
Matricially, relation (3) can be expressed by:
(𝛼1, ., 𝛼𝑛)𝑇 − 𝑝(1, ., 1)𝑇 = 𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔(2𝛽1, ., 2𝛽𝑛) (𝑞∗1, ., 𝑞
∗
𝑛)𝑇
𝛼 − 𝑝1𝑛 = 𝐻𝑞∗
With: 𝛼𝑇 = (𝛼1, ., 𝛼𝑛), 1𝑇𝑛 = (1, ., 1),
𝐻 = 𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔(2𝛽1, ., 2𝛽𝑛), 𝑞∗ = (𝑞∗1, ., 𝑞
∗
𝑛)𝑇 .
While H is a diagonal matrix, with non-zero diagonal compo-
nents; then, it is invertible, as result, we have:

























𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝛿−1, ., 𝛿−𝑖 , ., 𝛿−𝑛) (8)







) ≤ 0; in our case, we have:
𝑈”𝑖 (𝑞∗𝑖 ) = −2𝛽𝑖 < 0. (9)
As 𝑞∗
𝑖





) = 0. So, 𝑈𝑖 reaches




We assume that the unit cost is constant, it will be noted
by c. Based on [22], the PU’s profit will be given by:














Based on relations: (6), (7) and (8); we express as follows:
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1


















































From (10), we obtain Π according only to p.
Π(𝑝) = 1
2
(𝑝 − 𝑐) (𝛾𝑛 − 𝑝_𝑛) (12)
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The PU exposes the price that maximizes his profit. Let 𝑝∗
be such price. Since Π is differentiable, 𝑝∗ satisfies the first
optimality condition: Π
′ (𝑝∗) = 0.
Π
′ (𝑝∗) = 1
2
[𝛾𝑛 + 𝑐_𝑛 − 2_𝑛𝑝∗] = 0 (13)








The second optimality condition to be checked by 𝑝∗ is:

























Π(𝑝∗) = Π∗ (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) =
1
8_𝑛
(𝛾𝑛 − 𝑐_𝑛)2 (15)
From (5) and (14), the 𝑆𝑈𝑖 ′𝑠 profit can be written as:
𝑈𝑖 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) =
𝜎𝑖
4












From (15), we can easily remark that there are some
combination of SUs that lead to zero PU’s profit. In the
following, we will propose some examples.
1) finite number of SUs
• 𝛽1 = 2, 𝛽2 = 3, 𝛽3 = 4, 𝛼1 = 𝑐6 ,
𝛼2 =
5𝑐
4 , 𝛼3 =
7𝑐
3
𝛾3 = 𝜎1𝛼1 + 𝜎2𝛼2 + 𝜎3𝛼3 = 1312𝑐,
_3 = 𝜎1 + 𝜎2 + 𝜎3 = 1312
Π∗ (_3, 𝛾3) = 0
• 𝛽1 = 2, 𝛽2 = 3, 𝛼1 = 𝑐6 , 𝛼2 =
5𝑐
4
𝛾2 = 𝜎1𝛼1 + 𝜎2𝛼2 = 𝑐2 , _2 = 𝜎1 + 𝜎2 =
5
6
Π∗ (_2, 𝛾2) = 𝑐
2
60
Π∗ (_2, 𝛾2) > Π∗ (_3, 𝛾3)
Two SUs bring more payoff than three SUs.
2) infinite number of SUs



























= 0 =⇒ lim
𝑛→+∞
Π∗ (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) = 0
In this case, the PU have not interest to grow the number of
SUs to obtain zero profit, while a fewer number returns more.
From (16), we deduce that for some values of _𝑛 and 𝛾𝑛, we
have 𝑈𝑖 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) = 0. In this case, the 𝑆𝑈𝑖 prefers to not buy
spectrum.
In the next, we will study different configurations of PU’s and
SUs’ profits, as well as, the adopted strategy by each one, for
avoiding zero profit.
IV. TRANSACTIONS IN A MONOPOLY MARKET
A. Removing all SUs who cancel the PU’s profit
If the PU’s profit is zero, he removes one SU and after
calculates his payoff with the remaining SUs. If this value
equals zero, he decides to return the deleted SU, to replace
him by another and calculate again the profit, and so he repeats
the processsus, until a non-zero profit is met. We report that,
there are some cases where such non-zero profit can not exist,
whatever the deleted user. In front of this situation, instead of
deleting a single SU, the PU deletes two, based on all possible
combinations, until a non-zero profit is encountered. Similarly,
the obtained profits can all be equal to zero. And so, for three
SUs, four..., until a combination leading to non-zero profit is
encountered. The next theorem gives a necessary and sufficient
condition of existence of such combination.
Theorem 1: There is a combination of SUs with which the
PU’s profit is non-zero if and only if there is an index
𝑖0 ∈ {1...𝑛}, such as: 𝛼𝑖0 ≠ 𝑐.
Proof 1:
• We assume that there is a combination leading to non-
zero PU’s profit and we show that there is an index 𝑖0 ∈
{1...𝑛}, such as 𝛼𝑖0 ≠ 𝑐. We prove it by absurdity.
Then, we have the next logical expression:
There is a combination leading to non-zero profit and
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑐, ∀𝑖 ∈ {1...𝑛}.
We note this combination by: (𝑆𝑈𝑘1 , 𝑆𝑈𝑘2 , ..., 𝑆𝑈𝑘𝑝 ) that
verifies:
Π∗ (_(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝), 𝛾(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝)) ≠ 0. (17)
We have also:











𝜎𝑘1𝛼𝑘1 + 𝜎𝑘2𝛼𝑘2 + ... + 𝜎𝑘𝑝𝛼𝑘𝑝
𝛼𝑘1 + 𝛼𝑘2 + ... + 𝛼𝑘𝑝
=
𝛾(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝)
_(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝)
By referring to relation (15), we deduce:
Π∗ (_(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝), 𝛾(𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘 𝑝)) = 0.
It is a contradiction with (17).
• We assume that there is an index 𝑖0 ∈ {1...𝑛}, such as
𝛼𝑖0 ≠ 𝑐 and we show that there is a combination leading
to non-zero PU’s profit.
Trivial, just take the combination that contains only
𝑆𝑈𝑖0 , and the result will be immediate.
Therefore, it is sufficient to have a single 𝑆𝑈𝑖0 , such that 𝛼𝑖0 ≠
𝑐, for the PU to enter into the market.




|𝛼𝑖 − 𝑐 |. (18)
If 𝑑 is different to zero, he enters, otherwise he will not enter.
In the rest of this paper, we consider that 𝑑 ≠ 0. Therefore,
after deleting all SUs who cancel his profit, the PU will
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keep a combination with which will have non-zero profit, i.e.
Π∗ (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) ≠ 0 ⇐⇒ 𝛾𝑛_𝑛 ≠ 𝑐.





From (16), we have:






The SU does not have interest to play for harvesting zero
profit. Thus, all SUs who have zero profit retire one after one,
to leave in the market only those who have non-zero profit.
C. Interaction between SUs
We note that this interaction takes place in the presence of
at least two SUs having together zero profit.
We are in front of three cases:
• Case1: In the market, There are exactly two SUs, each
one has zero parofit:
Let 𝑆𝑈1 (𝛼1, 𝛽1), 𝑆𝑈2 (𝛼2, 𝛽2) be such users. Based on
relation (16), we can write:





⇐⇒ 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝑐 (21)
Each user has two possible strategies: participate (P) in
the game, i.e. buying a spectrum, or not participate (NP).
In this case, regardless of the strategy of each player, they
always have zero payoff.
• Case2: They are more than two SUs in the market, among
them, two have zero payoff.
Based on relation (16), we can write:












































































= \1 > 0. (24)
We note by 𝑃1 (𝑠1, 𝑠2) and 𝑃2 (𝑠1, 𝑠2), the 𝑆𝑈1’s and
𝑆𝑈2’s profit, when 𝑆𝑈1 and 𝑆𝑈2 adopt strategies 𝑠1 and
𝑠2, respectively. Knowing that: (𝑠1, 𝑠2) ∈ {𝑃, 𝑁𝑃}2.
Based on (23) and (24), table II presents the 𝑆𝑈 ′1𝑠 and
𝑆𝑈 ′2𝑠 profit in the non-cooperative case, according to the
adopted strategy by each one.
TABLE II
𝑆𝑈 ′1𝑠 AND 𝑆𝑈
′
2𝑠 PROFIT, IN THE NON-COOPERATIVE MODE
PPPPPP𝑆𝑈1
𝑆𝑈2 P NP
P (0, 0) (\1, 0)
NP (0, \2) (0, 0)
The SUs can cooperate to avoid zero payoff for both 𝑆𝑈1
and 𝑆𝑈2. In this situation, there are only two possible
couples of strategies: (P, NP) and (NP, P).
Then, let 𝑃𝑐1 and 𝑃
𝑐










2 (𝑃, 𝑁𝑃) =
\1 \2
\1+\2 ,




2 (𝑃, 𝑁𝑃) =
\22
\1+\2 .
Table III exposes the profit of each SU.
TABLE III
𝑆𝑈 ′1𝑠 AND 𝑆𝑈
′
2𝑠 PAYOFF, IN THE COOPERATIVE MODE
PPPPPP𝑆𝑈1
𝑆𝑈2 P NP

































As result, both players have an interest in removing the
player who has a minimum payoff in the non-cooperative
game, and in participating who has the maximum payoff.
• Case3: Currently, we generalize for k SUs. We denote by:
𝑆𝑈1, ..., 𝑆𝑈𝑘 these users.
By applying relation (16), we can write:























)2 = \1 > 0.
Sumilary, if:



















)2 = \𝑙 > 0.
Therefore, we have:
𝑃𝑙 (𝑠1, ..., 𝑠𝑘 ) > 0 ⇔ 𝑠𝑙 = 𝑃, 𝑠 𝑗 = 𝑁𝑃, ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙.
Then, in the non-cooperative game, only the remaining
player, after the deletions of all players who have zero
payoff, will participe in the market.
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Currently, we examine the cooperative case, when the
players negotiate, in order to have non-zero win and to
share the winnings according to the contribution of each
one.






, with: \ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{\𝑙/𝑙 ∈ {1, ..., 𝑘}}. (26)
Knowing that, the user who wins the maximum gain in
the non-cooperative game will play, and the others leave
the game.
From relation (26), we can easily extract three remarks:
1) 𝑃𝑐
𝑗
< \ 𝑗 : the 𝑆𝑈 𝑗 ′𝑠 payoff in non-cooperative game is






= \: the share of win between all SUs.
3) 𝑃𝑐
𝑗




: 𝑆 = (𝑁𝑃, ..., 𝑃, 𝑁𝑃.., 𝑁𝑃),
with: 𝑆𝑙 = 𝑃 and \𝑙 = \, is the dominant strategy for the
cooperative game.
To compare non-cooperative and cooperative games, we
calculate the average number 𝐴 of SUs that have non-zero
gain.
𝐴 =
Total nomber of users having non-zero payoff
Total number of SUs
For 𝑘 users, in the non-cooperative and cooperative games, we
have: 𝐴𝑛𝑐 = 𝑘
𝑘+1 and 𝐴
𝑐 = 𝑘 , respectively.
We can easily remark that 𝐴𝑐 >> 𝐴𝑛𝑐 .
D. Impact of cooperation on the PU’s payoff




(_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) and Π∗𝐶 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) be, the PU’s payoff in the
non-cooperative and cooperative cases, respectively. Then:
Π∗𝑁𝐶 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) =
1
8_𝑛







(𝛼 − 𝑐)2. (27)

























(2_𝑛 − Σ)2. (28)
Let f be the function defined by:
𝑓 : ]Σ, +∞[ −→ R+,
𝑥 −→ (𝛼 − 𝑐)
2
8(𝑥 − Σ) (2𝑥 − Σ)
2 (29)
Properties of function f:









P2: At the neighborhood of +∞, 𝑓 (𝑥) ≈ (𝛼−𝑐)
2
2 𝑥.
P3: 𝑓 (𝑥) ≥ (𝛼−𝑐)
2
2 𝑥, ∀𝑥 ∈ ]Σ, +∞[.
Then, from (27), (28) and P3 we have:
Π∗𝐶 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛) ≥ Π
∗
𝑁𝐶 (_𝑛, 𝛾𝑛). (30)




In the purpose to compare the SUs’ profits in the cooperative
case with those in the non-cooperative case, we consider some
number of SUs, and we calculate the values of 𝐴. Fig. 1
illustrates this comparison.
















Fig. 1. Comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative games
We can easily remark that the values of 𝐴 in the cooperative
case are very important comparing to those in the non-
cooperative case. This pheromone can be explained by the
massif increase of the number of SUs who have a non-
zero profit in the cooperative case. Moreover, this cooperation
allows SUs that have zero profit in the non-cooperative form
to earn non-zero profit.
B. PU’s performance
In the objective to compare the PU’s profit in the cooperative
case with that in the non-cooperative case, we take some value
of _ and we calculate the PU’s profit. Fig. 2 exposes the
obtained results.
We conclude that the curve of the cooperative case is always
on that of the non-cooperative case, and at the infinity, the
two curves approach. The participation of SUs that have zero
profit, decreases PU’s profit; because their role is destructive
in the market. Therefore, their withdrawal gives more profit to
other players.
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Fig. 2. PU’s profit in the cooperative and non-cooperative modes
C. Comparison between our performances and those of [19]
In order to compare our performances in the cooperative
form with those of [19] based on table 1.1 and table 1.2 of
the mentioned paper, we take the same number of SUs and
the same cost 𝑐 = 30. After the evaluation of the spectral
efficiency, and the PU’s profit , we obtain tables IV and V,
respectively.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR MEDEL AND THAT OF [19] IN
TERMS OF SPECTRUM EFFICIENCY









COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR MEDEL AND THAT OF [19] IN
TERMS OF PU’S PROFIT








The results of such tables, can be represented graphically
by fig. 3 and fig. 4.
We remark that for the smallest number of SUs, the perfor-
mance of [19] is better than ours; but for the higher number,
our results exceed those of [19]. This phenomenon can be
explained by the increase in overall profit, when the number
of cooperated SUs increases, and will be the same for the PU.































Fig. 3. Comparison between our model and that of [19] in terms of spectrum
efficiency




























Model of  [19] 
Fig. 4. Comparison between our model and that of [19] in terms of PU’s
profit
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the process of selling spectra by a
PU to the SUs. This market is supposed to be monopolized by
a single vendor, and the information is considered complete
and available to all actors who act rationally.
We have shown that even after maximizing the profits of the
PU or SUs, the obtained values can remain zero, and thus the
player has not benefited by his introduction into the market.
The study of the PU’s profit allows us to the establishment of
a necessary and sufficient condition on the actors’ parameters
for the held of the market. On the other hand, the analysis of
the SUs’ profits showed us that those who have zero profit can
avoid this situation by cooperating. Also, this cooperation is
in the interest of the PU too. All the work is based on perfect
information, where the players share the useful information.
In the case of non-perfect information, two scenarios can be
considered: Cooperative scenario: the players who share the
same information will be grouped together in the same cluster,
to cooperate to estimate the missing information. Through this
policy, the members of the same group reduce the level of risk.
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In non-cooperation scenario, the market can be organized as
an auction game; thus, the player with the best price buys the
spectrum.
VII. DISCUSSION
Cooperation between SUs adds costs to pay, especially in
terms of three parameters: the benefits of some SUs, algorith-
mic complexity and energy consumption. First, the SU who
has the maximum profit and participates in the cooperation, he
shares his profit with other SUs, and thus his initial profit is
reduced. Second, cooperation requires the identification of all
SUs, those with zero profit and the one with maximum profit.
After the participation of that particular SU, the profit calcula-
tion of each SU is done, to share the overall profit. Trivially, all
these operations increase the algorithmic complexity compared
to the non-cooperative form. Third, cooperation between actors
requires the exchange, memorization and processing of data,
via communication, storage and treatments devices. These
equipments require power to operate; consequently, the power
consumption will be increased. As result, even the positive
impact of cooperation, this strategy has its costs in terms of
some SUs’ benefits, computing time, and power consumption.
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